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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 22, 1977  
TIME: 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.  
PLACE: Secretary's  
Conference Room

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Mr. V.G. Makarov  
Mr. V.G. Komplektov  
Mr. N.N. Detinov  
Mr. A.A. Bessmertnykh  
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

United States

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance  
Assistant Secretary George S. Vest...  
Ambassador Paul C. Warnke  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Ambassador Marshall Shulman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Walter Slocombe  
LTG Edward L. Rowny  
Mr. Leslie H. Gelb  
Mr. William G. Hyland  
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

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William D. Krimer:ae 9/29/77  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Recalling the procedure following during their last meeting in Geneva, Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested that the Secretary start off first.

The Secretary first of all welcomed Gromyko and his colleagues to the State Department and said it was a pleasure and honor to receive them. As he had told Gromyko earlier, he very much looked forward to the opportunity of carrying on these discussions which they had started earlier. President Carter also looked forward to meeting Gromyko. The Secretary thought it would be useful to summarize at the outset where we were at present as a starting point for the discussions.

Gromyko thought that might be useful, but also believed that both sides had a good idea of where we were at present. The main task now was to find ways of resolving unagreed issues. However, he did not object to the Secretary's proceeding with a general review.

The Secretary agreed that the main questions to be discussed were those that were still unagreed. In order to reach successful completion of the agreement that both sides desired.

First, the Secretary wanted to affirm that the commitment of the U.S. to a SALT II agreement remained one of our most important foreign policy goals, and we were confident that with continued application of goodwill by both sides, and respect for each other's security interests, that goal was achievable.

In preparing for this meeting, we had reviewed our own security needs. We had also listened to and understood what the Soviet side had been saying about Vladivostok and other negotiations which were held in 1976. Although we had differences of interpretation about these negotiations, the Secretary was convinced that to dwell on these differences would not bring us closer to finding solutions for the issues that now faced us. Vladivostok had been a step forward for both countries in learning how to control the arms race. It could still serve as a foundation of the new agreement, but could not be the sole basis for agreement, because it did not cover certain problems, and technological changes since then had reduced its relevance in certain areas. Therefore, the Secretary suggested that attention now be focused on the few remaining key issues as Gromyko had suggested, and try to find common ground which would lead us to solutions.

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What we were seeking from these negotiations was genuine arms control--significant reductions of forces and real constraints on the modernization of forces--with the goal of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. The ceilings established by the 1972 Interim Agreement were an essential first step in curbing the competition in strategic arms. The Vladivostok principles of equality and of equal security were another important step.

But now we needed to go beyond agreements for minimal reductions in numbers, in order to begin to deal with those elements in each side's force structure which pose ever increasing threats to mutual security. In doing this we needed to start the process of controlling strategic arms in ways that would continue to provide equal security and would also lower the risk of nuclear war. Moreover, we could not allow technology to dictate our future; we had to take positive actions to control it.

Reaching a meaningful and fair SALT agreement was difficult, because each of us had developed strategic forces which differed in many key characteristics. But developing a balance of obligations, giving something to get something, was the essence of the process of negotiations. We want to embody the Vladivostok principles in a new agreement which includes meaningful arms control; at the same time, we should take into account new developments which have altered the spectrum of weapons which each side has at its disposal. Vladivostok in itself was not enough to provide final agreement. It could, however, serve as the foundation for an agreement.

The Secretary would also note that there were important areas of agreement between us, and we should keep in mind that the Delegations have completed work on the great bulk of the Joint Draft Text. The Secretary was also confident that once we found ways to resolve the differences which remain between us, progress toward final agreement should be rapid, very rapid.

In our discussions in Geneva, we had agreed on a three-part framework, which should enable us to conclude an agreement in the near future and move immediately into negotiations for SALT III. The basic Treaty, lasting until 1985, would embody the Vladivostok principles of equality, equal security and reductions in strategic offensive arms. Second, a Protocol to the Treaty, lasting three years, would contain interim

limits on systems on which agreement for the longer term was not yet possible. This would give us more time to consider more permanent limits in SALT III. And finally, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines would be an integral part of the three-part framework. The Principles which were being discussed by the Delegations in Geneva would govern the negotiations for SALT III.

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The Secretary would like to propose that we deal first with those issues in the Protocol where we were close to agreement. There were three issues: new types of ICBMs; mobile ICBMs, SLCMs and GLCMs. The Secretary believed that we should be able to agree that for the period of the Protocol there would be no testing or deployment of all new types of ICBMs, including those with MIRVs. In this connection, he would point out that this would hold up development and deployment of new ICBMs while we looked for new and verifiable restrictions we could impose in order to reduce further the dangers presented by systems with a first-strike capability. We were convinced that restrictions on modification and modernization of existing ICBMs were important. We differed on whether the ban should cover all or just some "new types". In response to the Soviet-proposed definition, the U.S. was unable to agree to ban only new types of MIRVed ICBMs. To do this would not be sufficient. We believed that the Soviet proposal would leave a large loophole. It would permit each side to test new ICBM launchers which could subsequently be equipped with existing MIRV warheads. It was for this reason that the Protocol should contain a provision banning all new types of ICBMs. The Secretary was hopeful that the Soviet side would agree with us on this point and that the issue could be turned over to the Delegations in Geneva for technical refinement.

On the second item--mobile ICBMs: from our discussions last May, we also appeared to be in agreement that mobile ICBMs should not be produced or deployed during the period of the Protocol. In this connection the Secretary wanted to confirm our understanding that the Soviet side was willing to agree not to produce or deploy the SS-16. It was also our understanding that we would be able to work out measures to assure us that the SS-20 launchers were not compatible with launching an ICBM. Responding to Gromyko's question, the Secretary confirmed that our position was "not to produce and not to deploy". So that there not be any lack of clarity in this respect, the Secretary said we believed that agreement on mobile ICBM issues was an important step which would avert a situation that would be much more difficult to bring under control if we did nothing now.

The Secretary next turned to SLCMs and GLCMs. He believed that with regard to limits on sea-based and land-based cruise missiles we were in agreement that the limits should be contained in the Protocol. To be specific, these limits would be: first, ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles would not be deployed with ranges over 600 km. Secondly, any test of a cruise missile over 600 km would be air-launched.

Korniyenko inquired whether this meant that ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles could be tested as long as these tests were carried out in an air-launched mode.

The Secretary confirmed this and said that our agreeing to these provisions in the Protocol was an effort to meet Soviet concerns, since there had been no prior agreement on these issues at all. If these issues could be resolved, all of them could be turned over to the Delegations in Geneva.

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~~The Secretary hoped that at the conclusion of the current negotiations in Washington it would be possible to say that the sides had agreed in principle on all three of these issues, and that all three could go to the Delegations in Geneva.~~

The Secretary hoped that at the conclusion of the current negotiations in Washington it would be possible to say that the sides had agreed in principle on all three of these issues, and that all three could go to the Delegations for technical resolution and for drafting final language.

The Secretary pointed out that although we were agreed on the basic framework of SALT II, we had not yet reached complete agreement on which issues would go into the Treaty and which into the Protocol, and we had yet to agree completely on the Principles for SALT III.

Gromyko confirmed that we were agreed on the framework in terms of the general structure of the agreement, but the Secretary was quite correct in saying that we now needed to talk about the problems that would fill out the elements of that framework.

The Secretary pointed out that our proposal of last May was still on the table and there was no need to review it again.

In the course of our diplomatic explorations, we had discussed some possible modifications to that proposal which, in our view, could equally well have served as the basis for dealing with the key unresolved issues and which we felt

took account of the Soviet position. We understood that these suggestions were not acceptable to the Soviet Union, but we would be interested to hear any further response that Gromyko might wish to make to these suggestions.

The Secretary turned to the Treaty and the contents of the Treaty. We were agreed in principle that there should be reductions from the overall aggregate of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles established in Vladivostok, but we were not agreed on the extent or timing of the reductions. The figure the Soviet side had mentioned was 2,250; but we believed a 10% reduction to 2,160 would be a more meaningful step toward the goal of further reductions. If the Soviet side was prepared to accept the 2,160 aggregate, we were prepared to move the deadline for these reductions from October 1979, the date we had originally suggested, to late 1980.

Turning next to the MIRV aggregate in the Treaty, the Secretary said we believed also that the MIRV aggregate should be lowered by 10% to about 1,200. The Soviet side had not responded definitively to this proposal. It was important to keep in mind that the U.S. would be affected earlier by this proposal than the Soviet Union, since we would have to reduce MIRVed systems already deployed. The Secretary further noted that if the Soviet side was prepared to agree to this reduction, we were prepared to agree not to count for the period of the Protocol the 120 launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaisk that were indistinguishable from MIRV launchers, but which the Soviet side said now contained non-MIRVed missiles. However, these 120 launchers would count at the end of the period of the Protocol. In sum, we were prepared to extend the date for the reduction in both ceilings. The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that we were in a position to make a serious and rapid response to any constructive response or counter proposal.

The Secretary now turned to other unresolved questions, starting first with heavy MIRVed ICBMs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers.

As he had said before, there was no need to go into detail on this issue. Limits on MIRVed heavy launchers was a question of major importance to the U.S. because of the threat these missiles posed to ICBM survivability. The U.S. was also convinced that both sides would benefit from a separate ceiling on MIRVed ICBMs of all types. As Gromyko knew, we had proposed a sub-limit of 190 on

MIRVed heavy missiles at the Geneva meeting. However, in the context of 2,160 overall and 1,200 MIRV aggregates we were prepared to discuss raising the sub-limit of MIRVed MLBMs to 220, for example, as long as an overall sub-limit of 800 was placed on MIRVed ICBMs. Additionally, both of these sub-limits would be in the Treaty lasting until 1985.

We recognized Soviet concerns about ALCM-carrying heavy bombers, although we could not accept the validity of the argument that would equate them to MIRVed missiles. We believed very strongly that ALCMs were clearly a deterrent, i.e. specifically a second-strike weapon, while MIRVed ICBMs were clearly a first-strike system.

In an effort to meet Soviet concerns, the U.S. was prepared to accept a sub-limit of 250 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. ALCMs with a range of between 600 km and 2,500 km could only be carried on heavy bombers. Moreover, we were prepared to put this limit of 250 into the Treaty lasting until 1985, as the Soviet side had proposed. This was in the context of our proposal for 220 MIRVed MLBM and 800 MIRVed ICBM sub-limits in the Treaty. A serious response to this proposal would, as the Secretary had said before, allow us to have further exchanges during this visit that could lead to agreement.

The Secretary next turned to the problem of Backfire. In this connection we had raised a number of questions in our previous talks to which Gromyko had indicated he would be responding. We await response to these questions with great interest.

On the question of ABM Treaty review, the Secretary said that we had already agreed on a joint statement reaffirming our commitment to the ABM Treaty. This statement should be issued by us at the conclusion of these talks or after Gromyko's meeting with the President tomorrow morning. We believed that announcement of reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty will be a reassuring sign that both sides were committed to nuclear arms control and that agreement between us was possible.

On expiration the Interim Agreement, the Secretary said that we had agreed to continue active negotiations with a view to completing a SALT II agreement in the near future. We had also discussed the desirability of each side confirming its intention not to take any action inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement after its expiration on October 3, in order to maintain the status quo while we continue our negotiations.

Responding to Gromyko's question of what was meant by the status quo, the Secretary replied that this was the status quo under the Interim Agreement, and said that we proposed to state that we would take no action that would be inconsistent with that agreement.

In conclusion, the Secretary expressed his belief that if we approached these negotiations with the flexibility on both sides of which Gromyko had spoken yesterday, we should be successful in our endeavors here.

Gromyko said he would first like to offer a few observations of a general nature regarding some of the statements the Secretary had included in his opening remarks. It would be difficult indeed to argue with some of them, because they closely corresponded to his own thoughts. Others, of course, raised questions in his mind. At the very outset the Secretary had emphasized the importance of limiting strategic offensive arms and concluding a new limitation agreement. The Soviet side had emphasized the same view many times and at various levels. Brezhnev and other leading figures of his country had done so repeatedly. He would take this opportunity once again to stress the great, he would even say immense, importance of this question to our two countries and to the world at large. Of course, strategic arms limitation was not yet disarmament. In his statement the Secretary had not used that word even once. After all, the levels we were now trying to establish were simply ceilings for the arms that the sides were going to produce, ceilings that might be reached. The Soviet Union's general policy was that establishment of ceilings for arms was only a stage on the road to disarmament, ideally, general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union had not given up that goal, and Gromyko wanted to reemphasize that the goal remained. He would not be disclosing a secret by saying that the Soviet Union would continue to proclaim that goal from the rostrum of the United Nations as well. Thus, the significance of the question currently being negotiated would have to be viewed in the proper context of the overall objective the Soviet Union was striving for. The specific problem we were negotiating was closely linked with the future policies of our two nations, which may or may not coincide. For the Soviet Union that goal was disarmament, for which it had begun to fight more than 50 years ago, that is from the very inception of the Soviet state in Lenin's days. The Soviet Union had been persistently pursuing that goal ever since the disarmament conference in Genoa some 60 years ago. This was the first point he wanted to make.



The significance of this point becomes even clearer if one considers that it was only our two nations that were engaged in negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms. What about others? So far, they were watching from the sidelines. He was saying this in order not to lose sight of the broader goals, for otherwise we might get so carried away by details as to lose sight of the major objectives we shared at least in part.

Gromyko's second remark concerned another statement the Secretary had made, and with that he would not argue either. The Secretary had mentioned the principle of equality and equal security. Precisely this was the principle the Soviet Union consistently adhered to. He had been glad to hear the Secretary acknowledge it--equality and an equal degree of security. He was quite certain that if either side were to try and deviate from strict compliance with that principle, our talks could not succeed. He would call upon the other side to adhere to it strictly. Of course, that was a statement of a general nature, the algebra of politics as it were, but it was necessary to translate it into the language of specific figures and provisions. He would say that the Secretary's thesis about technology was quite correct--for the Soviet Union it had always been axiomatic. One must not permit a situation to develop where technology caused us to lose sight of the ultimate political objective at the base of our discussions, the political course that our countries should pursue. Quite the contrary, technology had to be subordinated to policies and goals, and everything should be viewed from the standpoint of maintaining and strengthening world peace. This was a thesis that raised no doubts whatsoever in his mind.

Gromyko would now turn to a thesis with which he could not agree at all. He would set forth his views and point out where he disagreed. This referred to the assertion that the Vladivostok understanding was not sufficient as a basis for concluding a SALT II agreement. For his part, he was deeply convinced and quite certain that the Vladivostok understanding was fully adequate. Had it been adhered to before now, both sides would surely have had the SALT II agreement in their pockets. He thought the Secretary knew very well, perhaps better than the Soviet side, why it had not been possible to put that understanding into effect. At Vladivostok all the delicate issues involved in SALT had been discussed in great detail and viewed from all angles; the significance of each factor, its place in the overall

agreement, had been carefully weighed. Did the Secretary think that the participants in the Vladivostok meeting, above all, President Ford and Leonid Brezhnev, did not understand the issues involved as well as we did here? No, everything had been carefully weighed, and as a result a balance had been found which fully met the security interests of both sides. Thus, he absolutely could not accept the view that the Vladivostok understanding was not a sufficient basis for the SALT II agreement. Was it written somewhere in the stars that it was absolutely necessary to break the accord reached in Vladivostok? No, the Soviet Union did not approach this question so lightly, and he did not believe that others should either.

Gromyko had another remark to make regarding the three-part framework. It was a fact that the Soviet Union had moved toward the U.S. side in this matter in the hope that this would facilitate agreement on certain other questions involved in concluding a SALT II agreement. However, he was not convinced that this move had been duly appreciated. He would have to point out other instances when following detailed discussions the Soviet Union had moved toward the position of the United States, but what happened subsequently was that the U.S. side believed it possible to pocket concessions made by the Soviet side without taking into account the conditions attached to such concessions. He would ask the Secretary not to forget this aspect of the matter. In this respect, he specifically had in mind Soviet agreement to the U.S. proposal that "once tested with MIRVs, always a MIRV."

Further, before going into detail on specific issues Gromyko wanted to stress on behalf of the Soviet leadership that, as heretofore, the Soviet Union believed it possible and necessary promptly to complete a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to sign it. This was the main concern which determined the Soviet approach to the present meeting as well. Its outcome would depend on whether the U.S. side was prepared at this time to act in such a manner as to find mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding questions, and to give a green light to conclusion of a new agreement. He was convinced that both sides were equally interested in concluding the new agreement and in seeing further progress made toward the limitation of strategic arms. For this reason, any attempt to impose upon the other side any condition that was unacceptable to that side, and thus to derive a unilateral

advantage, would be doomed to failure from the very outset. At the same time, such attempts could only complicate and drag out the negotiations. Gromyko believed it quite appropriate to recall this here, bearing in mind the time factor. It was not only a matter of the Interim Agreement's expiring soon and the need to replace it by a new long-term agreement. In the final analysis it was a matter of the urgent need to block the further development and introduction of ever new types of strategic arms, and to ensure the continuity of our efforts to limit and reduce strategic arms, not just in words, but in deeds as well. Further loss of time can entail immense losses for both sides and not only for them; it could throw back our efforts to curb the arms race and worsen the chances of maintaining peace. He would tell the Secretary quite directly that the Soviet leadership could not reconcile itself to such a prospect. It was difficult to believe that such prospect could meet the national interests of the United States or other countries, although in some place, in some countries, unfortunately there were some people whose thought processes were limited by their own four walls. Such people appeared to give no thought at all to what could happen unless we took the steps we were talking about. Truly responsible statesmen should be above such narrow ways of thinking. Given a general understanding on this course, our task consisted in concretely dealing with and resolving still outstanding questions. To do this was entirely possible, especially in view of the fact that when he and the Secretary had met in Geneva, both sides had confirmed that the new agreement should be based on the Vladivostok accord, taking into account subsequent negotiations. It was important, however, that this policy be consistently complied with insofar as it applied to all the questions under discussion and to strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage for either side. The Soviet Union had acted in this spirit at all stages of the negotiations. Moreover, manifesting goodwill and a constructive approach, the Soviet side had repeatedly moved toward the position of the U.S. side on very major questions. Such flexibility and constructive approach lay at the basis of the proposals the Soviet side had tabled at the May meeting in Geneva on a whole complex of outstanding questions, and these proposals made it possible to achieve realistic, mutually acceptable, and fair solutions which would enable the two sides to conclude the new agreement. The Soviet Union was counting on a positive response from the United States. To be fair, it should also be noted that whatever headway has been made at the negotiations in Geneva after the May meeting was above all due to the purposeful

efforts of the Soviet side to cooperate with the U.S. Delegation. In the course of the May meeting, the Soviet side had quite justly pointed out the advantages of including all the issues involved in the negotiations in a formal single document, an agreement or treaty with a term through 1985. At the same time, in an effort to meet the wishes of the U.S. side the Soviet Union had agreed in principle to consider the possibility that along with the basic agreement or treaty, some understanding be reached for a shorter period of time, providing an interim solution for several issues in order to allow time for further negotiations. The Soviet Union now reaffirmed that along with a basic agreement or treaty it would agree to include some issues in a Protocol with a three-year term, which would be an integral part of the basic agreement or treaty. In May the two sides had also agreed to try jointly to work out some recommendations for subsequent negotiations, making sure that this should not slow down preparation and conclusion of the new agreement. Such recommendations would form the third tier of the agreement between us. He recalled that by mutual agreement this matter and several other issues where our positions were close and been referred to the two Delegations in Geneva for the purpose of working out appropriate language.

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Gromyko noted that in the Secretary's statement a suggestion had been made that the question of mobile ICBMs be referred to the Delegations in Geneva as a new question. He would point out, however, that that had already been agreed upon last May. The Delegations had that issue on the table before them. Regretfully he had to note that the work in Geneva was not proceeding as expeditiously as he would like to have seen it proceed. But first, he believed it necessary to focus our attention on those issues where the differences between our respective positions were so great as to make it meaningless to refer them to the Delegations in Geneva.

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Gromyko first took up the issue of cruise missiles. He wanted to stress very seriously and resolutely that, if both sides wanted to have an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, it had to provide for limitations on long-range cruise missiles as well. There were no factual or juridical grounds for excluding cruise missiles from the strategic arms to be limited. Perhaps some General or other might wish it were otherwise, but after all statesmen stood at a higher level precisely in order to be able to see further than Generals. So that there would be complete clarity in this matter, he wanted to repeat that

the Soviet Union saw no sense at all in any new agreement that would not include certain limitations on cruise missiles. Otherwise, it would not be an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, but on legalizing the arms race in a new channel. Indeed, if there are hot heads in the United States who believe it possible to leave that channel open, they must either be opposed to any limitation agreement, or simply very naive people. The people of the Soviet Union and, he was sure, the people of the United States as well, wanted to see an end to the arms race, not its continuation. People the world over were hoping for precisely such an outcome. They wanted to believe that statesmanship will prevail, and not the short-term considerations and blindness of those whose actions and positions are determined solely by their close ties to military-industrial circles. Gromyko did not think he was exceeding the bounds of diplomacy when he said this here at the talks, because it had been written about in many newspapers, had been talked about on radio and television in many countries, including the United States. Thus, it was not a new idea for the Secretary. In this connection he would recall that in the course of the May meeting in Geneva the U.S. side had also in principle recognized the need to limit cruise missiles. True, the nature of the limitation proposed by the U.S. side was clearly inappropriate, as he had pointed out at that time, and it had been agreed to continue negotiations on this question. He would say at once that what the Secretary had said on this issue in his opening remarks today would not help to resolve the problem. He was referring to the proposal on ALCMs on heavy bombers. He noted that the USG had taken a decision to produce and deploy cruise missiles. This had been announced demonstratively, first and foremost as had been said in this country "for the Kremlin to note". How was this to be understood? Was it an attempt to predetermine the question of cruise missiles, ignoring our bilateral negotiations? The United States side had to realize what responsibility it was thereby assuming in terms of the fate of the agreement and in terms of unleashing a new spiral in the race in strategic arms. Nevertheless, adhering to its course, based on principle, with respect to the issue of cruise missiles, the Soviet Union had displayed flexibility to the extent possible, and had taken into account the wishes of the U.S. side. Gromyko would now restate the Soviet position on the entire complex of the cruise missile issue.

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Gromyko said that the Soviet Union had agreed that in the event a heavy bomber was equipped with ASCMs with ranges between 600 and 2,500 km each such missile should not be counted in the aggregate number of 2,400 delivery vehicles, but that the bombers themselves should in that case be counted as vehicles equipped with MIRVs, and accordingly be counted in the 1,320 aggregate level established for such vehicles. The Soviet Union could not agree to any deviation from that position.

ALCMs

Gromyko went on to say that air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range in excess of 2,500 km must be banned. As he saw it, there was no difference between us on this score. He thought this was one of the questions on which the two sides had managed to resolve their difficulties.

ALCMs

Further, it appeared to be already agreed that the new agreement should include a clause stipulating that aircraft other than heavy bombers must not be equipped with ASCMs with a range in excess of 600 km. If his understanding was correct, that was agreed.

ALCM

The Soviet Union continued to believe that such a solution of the long-range ASCM issue would indeed meet the purposes of the ongoing negotiations, and would take into account the positions of both sides. Provisions on this score should be included in the basic agreement or treaty.

Gromyko pointed out that he had already said that for the Soviet Union it was not acceptable to provide the sole limitation on heavy bombers with cruise missiles in terms of the number of 250 proposed by the U.S. side. In actual fact, this would be tantamount to the absence of any limitation at all.

As for GLCMs and SLCMs with a range over 600 km, the Soviet side believed that the most effective solution of this question would be inclusion in the agreement of an obligation by the sides generally not to develop such missiles. However, provided that mutually acceptable agreement is reached on long-range ASCMs, the Soviet side was prepared to agree that the question of GLCMs and SLCMs with ranges over 600 km be dealt with in the three-year Protocol, to the effect that during its term the sides not conduct any further testing and not deploy

ALCMs

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such missiles, bearing in mind that this matter in complex with others would be the subject of further discussions. Gromyko repeated the words "in complex with others" and added "and only in complex with others".

Gromyko said that the Soviet proposal on cruise missiles demonstrated the constructive approach of the Soviet side and its readiness to seek solutions to outstanding questions, which to the extent possible took into account the position of the United States. However, there should be no illusions to the effect that the Soviet Union, to the detriment of its own security interests and the principle of equality and equal security, would agree to revision of previously resolved questions. This was precisely the goal of the persistent attempts by the U.S. side to revise the question of heavy missiles. He would tell the Secretary bluntly that the Soviet Union would not discuss the question of heavy missiles, neither the question of their overall numbers nor the question of equating them with MIRVs. Both these questions had also been concretely resolved at Vladivostok in complex with other issues. Should the Secretary ask what other issues, Gromyko would reply, first and foremost in complex with U.S. forward-based nuclear systems. This had been the last of the important knots that had been untied at that time. Anyone who had taken part in the Vladivostok meeting would be able to confirm that, although during that part of the Vladivostok talks, when these two questions were unraveled, only a very few people were present. According to the agreement reached then, the Soviet Union was given a free hand with regard to heavy missiles, within the limits of the Interim Agreement of course, while the United States was to act accordingly in the area of forward-based systems, and in this connection the Soviet side had made certain proposals which concerned the next stage of negotiations, which should also be reflected in the agreement being negotiated now. Gromyko believed that all of this should be well known to the Secretary, and expressed his trust that no accident of any kind had occurred to destroy the memcons from Vladivostok. To raise the question of heavy missiles again could not be seen as anything other than an attempt by the United States to obtain a unilateral advantage by altering the balance of interests at the basis of the Interim Agreement and the Vladivostok Accord. If the United States was really interested in achieving a new agreement, it should renounce such attempts, which could only complicate our negotiations. Such was the view of the Soviet leadership; there was no other view and there could not be any other view. Gromyko was saying this quite frankly and

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sincerely, although he could of course say much more about US forward-based systems; but that would be a repetition of what had been said in the past, of what the Secretary was surely well aware of. Moreover, even given the understanding he had just referred to, the US side should have been doing something about its forward-based systems. This was yet to be done.

Regarding the Backfire, Gromyko thought the Secretary would be fully aware of the Soviet position with respect to this aircraft, a position based on principle. The aircraft called Backfire in the United States was a medium bomber, and therefore unrelated to the subject matter of the strategic arms negotiations. Nevertheless, in the interests of progress at the negotiations, the Soviet side had displayed a readiness here, too, to go as far as possible in taking into account the wishes of the US side. Gromyko proceeded from the premise that an understanding had already been reached to the effect that no provision concerning this aircraft would be incorporated in any bilateral document. It could only be handled by means of a unilateral statement by the Soviet side. Somewhat later during the current meeting he intended to say something about the possible content of such unilateral statement, provided the course of the current meeting warranted it.

Gromyko wanted to confirm the readiness of the Soviet side to include an obligation in the three-year Protocol not to test or deploy new types of MIRVed ICBMs (he emphasized and stressed MIRVed, and not ICBMs in general). Precisely such an approach, limiting those arms which had the greatest destabilizing effect upon the strategic balance, and fully meeting the objectives of the negotiations, ensued from the Vladivostok accord which drew a clear distinction between two types of delivery vehicles -- MIRVed and non-MIRVed. From this standpoint it would be logical also to ban for the period of the Protocol the testing and deployment of SLBMs with MIRVs. The Soviet Union was prepared to reach agreement on this basis. In this connection it is envisaged that both sides would also undertake not to deploy those types of new ICBMs and SLBMs with MIRVs, which had already been tested, but not yet deployed. There should be no difficulty in terms of verification by the sides of compliance with the obligation

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not to deploy new types of MIRVed missiles, particularly if it were agreed that the MIRV aggregate include all missiles of those types which had at least once been tested with MIRVs. After all, in that case, the sides would always be sure that in the event any new type of ICBM or SLBM with a single warhead made its appearance, such missiles would not be equipped with MIRVs. In this connection Gromyko felt he had to say once again that Soviet readiness to agree to such a method of counting MIRVed missiles was contingent on mutually acceptable agreement on cruise missiles and other outstanding issues. He felt it necessary to remind the Secretary of the fact that some people in Washington had forgotten or pretended to have forgotten this condition, although in the past the Soviet side had been assured that this was how the US side understood matters to be. He emphasized that from the very outset the Soviet side had stressed this contingent relationship between the issues, and the Secretary's predecessor had confirmed to Gromyko that there was complete agreement on this score. During the meetings with Secretary Vance in Moscow and in Geneva Gromyko had reemphasized this understanding once again. Thus, there should be no lack of clarity here.

Gromyko turned to the question of overall aggregates. He noted that as a result of discussions in Geneva it had been confirmed that the new agreement or treaty should formalize the level arrived at in Vladivostok for total numbers of strategic delivery vehicles -- 2,400, and total numbers of strategic delivery vehicles equipped with MIRVs -- 1,320. At the same time the Soviet side had presented relevant arguments in support of its position as to when and with regard to what elements major reductions in strategic arms could be discussed in the future. Nonetheless, in trying to accommodate the persistent wishes of the US side, the Soviet side had expressed its readiness in principle to provide in the agreement being worked out now, along with the levels agreed in Vladivostok, for reductions even before expiration of that agreement, namely that the overall aggregate of 2,400 to be reduced by 150 to 2,250 after 1980. He wanted to stress again that the Soviet side believed it possible to reduce strategic arms below the levels agreed in Vladivostok only with due account for all the other factors influencing the strategic situation. Its consent to a reduction to 2,250 should be viewed as a gesture of goodwill toward the new Administration of the United States. If at the present time the Soviet Union believed it possible to accept levels below

those agreed in Vladivostok, it was doing so only on condition of reciprocity on the part of the United States in terms of specific steps aimed at finding mutually-acceptable solutions to other outstanding questions. Unfortunately, apart from the fact that so far the Soviet side had not seen any such steps on the part of the US side, the US delegation in Geneva had in effect opposed that proposal, insisting on different time limits for reductions.

Gromyko said it was also difficult to understand the US position at Geneva on the question of mobile missiles. He would say it appeared to be illogical. While proposing to ban for the period of the Protocol testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, the US delegation objects to the Soviet proposal to ban the testing of mobile ICBMs, although there is no doubt that a mobile ICBM would be a new type of ICBM. This was clearly an inconsistent position. Gromyko said that he and his colleagues would, of course, closely study what the Secretary had said on mobile missiles today, but his first impression was that it had contained nothing new. For his part, he would reaffirm the Soviet proposal to include an obligation in the three-year Protocol for the sides to refrain from testing and deployment of land-based mobile ICBM launchers and missiles for such launchers. In this connection he wanted to stress that this, of course, referred to mobile launchers for missiles of intercontinental range.

As for the Soviet missile system called SS-20 in the United States, as the Soviet side had said repeatedly, that system was being deployed to carry out missions at medium range, in replacement of other systems having similar purposes. As far as its technical capabilities were concerned, the SS-20 launcher cannot be used for launching an ICBM. He would also repeat that the Soviet side does not intend to convert such launchers to give them that capability. This has been stated officially by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva.

In conclusion, Gromyko believed it necessary to draw the attention of the US side to other questions of great importance, which somehow had been left on the sidelines by the United States, perhaps because the US side found them unsavory. These were the issues of non-transfer of strategic arms to third countries and non-circumvention of the agreement through third countries or in any other manner. At the May meeting in Geneva, Gromyko had presented the Soviet position on these questions in detail, and there was no need to repeat it now. He would only note that the position taken by the US delegation in Geneva on these two

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issues was completely unconstructive. The formulation proposed by the US side recently for inclusion in the new agreement was so vague that it could not be regarded as a serious proposal.

Finally, Gromyko wanted to say a few words on US forward-based nuclear systems (in an aside he asked that these words be written in capital letters). He would ask the Secretary to abstract himself from his own position if he could, and take a look at this matter through Soviet eyes as it were. In May the Soviet side had set forth two alternatives for the solution of this question in terms of the agreement being negotiated now, and in dependence on the course the United States would take on outstanding questions. If necessary, he could remind the Secretary of these two variants. Being as it may, there should be no illusion to the effect that one could avoid resolving this question in the future, if not now, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, if our relations were to be conducted seriously. He thought there might be some people on the US side who would simply want the Soviet Union to close its eyes to this problem, but they would not succeed.

These were the matters that Gromyko had found it necessary to bring to the attention of the Secretary, those who helped the Secretary at the negotiations, and through him to the President of the United States and the United States Government. He was convinced that the overall Soviet approach as well as the Soviet position on specific issues made it possible to find a fair and mutually acceptable solution to all outstanding questions in a way that would enhance the security interests of both sides. The Soviet approach and position were based on the Vladivostok Accord and the results of subsequent negotiations. To the maximum extent possible they also took into account specific features of the US position. Gromyko was sure that, given the desire on both sides and mutual efforts by both sides, objectively it was possible to complete the new agreement at an early stage. This was what we should strive for, because any arrangement agreed upon and any agreement concluded had to replace the Interim Agreement which could not even serve as a component of the new agreement.

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Gromyko thought that possibly he might not have touched on some elements touched upon in the Secretary's statement today. If so, he would reserve his right to return to these questions in the course of the talks in a broader context. He now wanted to conclude his remarks in view of the important function awaiting him and the Secretary.

The Secretary said that he and his colleagues had listened carefully to what Gromyko had said. He would wish to comment later in our discussions on what Gromyko had said, perhaps later today. In view of the important function Gromyko had mentioned (lunch) he would defer his comments for now.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary was manifesting the necessary flexibility.

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